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Several quantum key distribution (QKD) protocols employ iterative sifting. After each quantum
transmission round, Alice and Bob disclose part of their setting information (including their basis
choices) for the detected signals. This quantum phase then ends when the basis dependent termi-
nation conditions are met, i.e., the numbers of detected signals per basis exceed certain pre-agreed
threshold values. Recently, however, Pfister et al. [New J. Phys. 18 053001 (2016)] showed that the
basis dependent termination condition makes QKD insecure, especially in the finite key regime, and
they suggested to disclose all the setting information after finishing the quantum phase. However,
this protocol has two main drawbacks: it requires that Alice possesses a large memory, and she also
needs to have some a priori knowledge about the transmission rate of the quantum channel.
Here we solve these two problems by introducing a basis-independent termination condition to
the iterative sifting in the finite key regime. The use of this condition, in combination with Azuma’s
inequality, provides a precise estimation on the amount of privacy amplification that needs to be
applied, thus leading to the security of QKD protocols, including the loss-tolerant protocol [Phys.
Rev. A 90, 052314 (2014)], with iterative sifting. Our result allows the implementation of wider
classes of classical post-processing techniques in QKD with quantified security.
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum key distribution (QKD) is a way to distribute
a key to distant parties in an information-theoretic secure
manner, and this key is mainly to be used in one-time pad
to achieve secure communication. Conventionally, QKD
protocols, such as the BB84 scheme [1], run the following
two phases alternately and repeatedly: a quantum com-
munication phase and a classical post-processing phase.
In the former phase, the sender (Alice) randomly chooses
a basis to encode a bit value into an optical pulse that
she sends to the receiver (Bob). On the receiving side,
Bob randomly chooses a measurement basis to decode
the bit value encoded in the optical pulse received. Af-
ter each quantum communication round, Alice and Bob
move on to the latter phase where they usually employ
an authenticated public channel to disclose part of their
information, which includes their basis choices and the
information on whether or not Bob detected the pulse.
The quantum communication phase terminates when the
basis dependent termination conditions are satisfied, i.e.,
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when the numbers of the basis-matched detection in-
stances for each basis exceed certain pre-agreed threshold
values. This procedure is called iterative sifting, and is
widely used in several QKD protocols and security proofs
[2].
Recently, Pfister et al. [3] showed that, rather surpris-
ingly, when the BB84 protocol uses the basis dependent
iterative sifting, especially in the finite key regime, it is
insecure if one employs the random sampling theory for
the parameter estimation for privacy amplification. In
so doing, they noticed that the basis dependent iterative
sifting violates the random sampling assumption because
Eve’s knowledge of Alice and Bob’s iterative sifting dis-
cussion allows her to bias the sampling. Moreover, it vi-
olates basis-independence because the termination con-
dition is basis-dependent. This insecurity is a serious
problem because it implies that a number of existing fi-
nite key security proofs [2] could be flawed and, therefore,
cannot guarantee the security of the BB84 protocol with
iterative sifting. To solve this issue, Pfister et al. [3] sug-
gested to postpone all the announcement until the end
of the quantum communication phase, as Lo, Chau and
Ardehali [4, 5] proposed. That is, the idea is to fix the
number of pulses sent rather than the number of pulses
detected.
The insecurity of the iterative sifting means in par-
ticular that Alice needs a large memory to store all the
basis and bit information until the end of the quantum
2communication phase, which we would like to avoid in
practice. Moreover, in order to properly determine the
number of pulses to be sent, Alice has to have a good a
priori knowledge on the transmission rate of the quantum
channel, which is difficult because Eve may change her
strategy frequently. Hence, it is very important for the
field of QKD to find a solution to these problems. Also,
such a solution can shed new light on how to deal with
information disclosure in QKD schemes without threat-
ening their security.
In this paper, we address this issue and present a sim-
ple proof to show that if a QKD protocol employs the
basis independent termination condition for iterative sift-
ing, instead of the basis dependent one, and if one em-
ploys Azuma’s inequality [6], which is more general than
the random sampling theory, to estimate the parameters
needed for privacy amplification, then the QKD protocol
is secure even in the finite key regime. Here, note that
the quantum communication phase terminates in the ba-
sis independent manner, but Alice and Bob are allowed
to announce basis information after each round of the
quantum transmission part. With this sifting, the mem-
ory requirements of Alice and Bob is reduced because
they can simply throw away the bit value when the sig-
nals are not detected, and they do not need to have a
good a priori knowledge on the transmission rate of the
quantum channel.
In order to provide an intuition of our idea, suppose
that Alice and Bob are at the ith quantum communica-
tion round of a QKD scheme with iterative sifting. That
is, Eve has at her disposal all the classical information
(which includes the basis information) announced by Al-
ice and Bob in the previous (i − 1) rounds. This means,
in particular, that she can adapt her eavesdropping strat-
egy for the ith pulse sent by Alice based on such avail-
able information [7]. This implies that the random sam-
pling theory cannot be applied to this scenario because,
roughly speaking, this theory requires that Eve’s attack
on the whole signals sent by Alice must be independent of
all the basis information. Importantly, however, thanks
to the basis independence of the termination condition
as well as due to the fact that Eve does not have any a
priori knowledge on the basis choices that Alice and Bob
will make at each of the rounds, Eve’s strategy for the ith
pulse cannot depend on the classical information that Al-
ice and Bob will announce at the end of that round. And
it turns out that these two conditions are enough to be
able to apply Azuma’s inequality [8]. As a consequence,
one can prove the security of QKD with iterative sifting.
We remark the following implication of our result: if the
security proof of a QKD protocol employs Azuma’s in-
equality for the parameter estimation needed for privacy
amplification [9, 10], this protocol is still secure even if it
adopts basis independent iterative sifting. This is so be-
cause one of the essential points of such proofs is the inde-
pendence of the basis choice at each round, and therefore
they can safely adopt basis-independent iterative sifting
without compromising their security. Such protocols in-
clude, for example, the loss-tolerant protocol [11] and its
generalized version [12].
The paper is organized as follows. In Sec. II, we
summarize the assumptions that we make in this paper.
Then, in Sec. III we introduce the BB84 protocol with ba-
sis independent iterative sifting. In Sec. IV, we present
a virtual protocol that is mathematically equivalent to
the BB84 scheme with basis independent iterative sifting.
This virtual protocol will be used in the security proof
that we provide later on. Also, in this section, we explain
why the BB84 protocol with basis dependent iterative
sifting is insecure when one employs the random sam-
pling theory. Then, in Sec. V, we present our main result
to show that the protocol is secure if one uses Azuma’s in-
equality and basis independent iterative sifting. Finally,
we discuss the security of the loss-tolerant protocol with
iterative sifting and the basis independent termination
condition, and summarize our findings in Sec. VI.
II. ASSUMPTIONS AND DEFINITIONS
In this section, we summarize the assumptions and def-
initions that we use in this paper. For simplicity, we
consider the BB84 protocol with a single-photon source.
Alice randomly chooses a bit value and encodes it using
the Z or the X basis, which she selects with probability
p
(A)
Z and p
(A)
X , respectively. We express the single-photon
state generated by Alice when she chooses a bit value b
and the basis α as |bα〉B. Here, the subscript B means
that this single-photon system will be sent to Bob, and we
define the Z (X) basis as {|0Z〉, |1Z〉} ({|0X〉, |1X〉}) with
|0X〉 := (|0Z〉 + |1Z〉)/
√
2 and |1X〉 := (|0Z〉 − |1Z〉)/
√
2.
Also, for simplicity, we shall assume that the state prepa-
ration is perfect.
As for Bob, he measures the incoming system B′, which
is the system B after Eve’s intervention, using the Z ba-
sis or the X basis, which he chooses with probability p
(B)
Z
and p
(B)
X , respectively. Note that the state of the sys-
tem B′ is not necessarily a qubit state. But, we assume
that Bob’s measurement satisfies the basis independent
detection efficiency condition. That is, when the Z (X)
basis measurement is represented by a positive opera-
tor valued measure (POVM) MZ = {M0Z,M1Z,Mfail}
(MX = {M0X,M1X,Mfail}), then the operator Mfail is
the same for both bases [11]. Here, Mbα represents the
POVM element associated to the detection of the bit
value b in the basis α, and the operator Mfail represents
the failure of outputting a bit value. We call an instance
with an outcome associated to the operator Mbα a de-
tected instance.
In addition, for simplicity, we shall assume that in the
error correction step of the protocol, Alice and Bob agree
in advance on a family of error correcting codes to correct
the errors. Afterward, they check if the errors have been
corrected by employing an error verification step, which
succeeds with high probability. Finally, we consider that
3there are no side-channels available to Eve from Alice
and Bob’s labs.
III. DESCRIPTION OF THE BB84 PROTOCOL
WITH BASIS INDEPENDENT ITERATIVE
SIFTING
In this section, we provide the description of the
actual BB84 protocol with basis independent iterative
sifting; it runs as follows.
(Actual protocol)
(1) Alice and Bob agree, over an authenticated public
channel, on a number N
(Ter)
det , the secrecy parame-
ter ǫs, the correctness parameter ǫc, a family of er-
ror correcting codes, and two families of hash func-
tions, one for privacy amplification and the other
one for error verification. Also, they initialize a pa-
rameterNdet to zero, and they announce the proba-
bilities p
(A)
Z (p
(B)
Z ) and p
(A)
X (p
(B)
X ) with which Alice
(Bob) chooses the Z and X bases, respectively.
(2) (Loop phase 1) Alice chooses the basis α ∈ {Z,X}
with probability p
(A)
α , and she chooses a bit value
b at random. She records these values, and sends
Bob a single-photon state |bα〉B.
(3) (Loop phase 2) Bob measures the incoming sys-
tem B′ using the Z (X) basis, which he selects with
probability p
(B)
Z (p
(B)
X ). Then he informs Alice over
an authenticated public channel whether or not he
detected the signal as well as the basis information.
If the signal is detected, Alice informs Bob of the
basis choice over an authenticated public channel,
Alice and Bob increase Ndet by 1 unit, and Bob
records his basis choice and the resulting bit value.
If Ndet = N
(Ter)
det is satisfied, Alice and Bob proceed
to Step (4), otherwise Alice and Bob return to Step
(2).
(4) (Defining the sifted key) Each of Alice and Bob
defines the bit string originating from the detected
instances with the Z (X) basis as the sifted key,
which we denote by ~sA,Z (~sA,X) and ~sB,Z (~sB,X),
respectively.
(5) (Parameter estimation) Alice and Bob announce
~sA,X and ~sB,X over an authenticated public channel,
and they calculate the Hamming weight wt(~sA,X ⊕
~sB,X), which is the number of mismatches between
~sA,X and ~sB,X. From wt(~sA,X ⊕ ~sB,X), Alice and
Bob estimate the number of bits that need to be
removed from ~sA,Z and ~sB,Z in the privacy amplifi-
cation step.
(6) (Error correction and privacy amplification) Alice
and Bob perform error correction on ~sA,Z and ~sB,Z
by using an error correcting code chosen from the
family selected in Step (1). It requires the exchange
of λEC bits of syndrome information over the au-
thenticated public channel. Then, they perform
privacy amplification on the corrected sifted keys
by using a hash function chosen at random from
the pre-agreed set of hash functions. As a result,
Alice (Bob) obtains the bit string ~fA,Z (~fB,Z).
(7) (Error verification) Alice and Bob select at ran-
dom a hash function from the pre-agreed set of
hash functions established in Step (1), and they
perform error verification on ~fA,Z and ~fB,Z. This
process consumes at most log2 2/ǫc bits of a pre-
viously shared key [13]. If the error verification
fails, they discard all the data. Otherwise, Alice’s
(Bob’s) key is ~fA,Z (~fB,Z).
We have three remarks to make. First, Ndet includes
both the basis matched and mismatched events. Second,
in practical QKD protocols, to achieve a high repetition
rate, Alice may want to send single-photons before she
obtains Bob’s announcement in Loop phase 2 regarding
with the previous single-photons. As a result, Alice con-
tinues to send pulses even if the number of the detection
events exceeds N
(Ter)
det , and Bob may obtain a number of
detection events greater than than N
(Ter)
det . In this case,
we define the protocol such that Bob simply discards the
events that exceed N thdet (they are actually treated as the
non-detected events), and Alice and Bob proceed as pre-
scribed in the Actual protocol. Finally, we also note that
in the parameter estimation step Alice does not need to
announce ~sA,X. This is so because it suffices if one of the
parties calculates wt(~sA,X⊕~sB,X). However, we prefer to
keep the Actual protocol as described above to show that
the disclosure of ~sA,X does not compromise its security.
To analyze the security of the Actual protocol, we pro-
ceed as in [9–11, 14–16] and we consider a virtual proto-
col that is equivalent to the Actual protocol from Eve’s
viewpoint. The virtual protocol is introduced in the next
section.
IV. VIRTUAL PROTOCOL AND BRIEF
REVIEW OF THE INSECURITY OF THE BB84
PROTOCOL BASED ON RANDOM SAMPLING
In this section, we present a virtual protocol that is
mathematically equivalent to the Actual protocol de-
scribed above and, therefore, we can use it for the security
proof. To prove its security, one can either use the secu-
rity proof technique based on the uncertainty principle
[15] or the one based on the entropic uncertainty relation
[17]. Most importantly, the virtual protocol provides a
clear description of the state to which one can apply the
security proof. Indeed, the main purpose of this section
is to describe such a state. Moreover, in the second part
of this section, we discuss the essential points that render
4the BB84 scheme with iterative sifting insecure when the
parameter estimation is based on the random sampling
theory [3].
We start by noting that Alice’s state preparation pro-
cess in the Actual protocol can be decomposed into
two steps. First, she prepares two single-photons in
the maximally entangled state |φ+〉AB := (|0Z〉A|0Z〉B +
|1Z〉A|1Z〉B)/
√
2. Afterwards, she measures the system A
in a basis α ∈ {Z,X} selected probabilistically, and sends
Bob the system B. In the virtual protocol shown below,
we assume that Alice adopts this two-step process in her
state preparation.
One important point in the virtual protocol is that we
require that Alice and Bob postpone their measurements
for the sifted key generation, while we keep all the
classical and quantum information that is available to
Eve exactly the same as that in the Actual protocol.
As for Alice, we simply consider that she postpones
her measurements on her systems A until the end of
the Loop phases (see virtual protocol below). This is
possible because whether she performs her measurement
before or after sending the system B does not change any
statistics. In the case of Bob, we exploit the basis inde-
pendent detection efficiency condition. This allows us to
decompose his measurement into the following two steps.
First, Bob performs a filtering operation described by a
pair of Kraus operators {√Mfail,
√
1 −Mfail}, where the
former Kraus operator corresponds to the non-detected
instance and the latter one represents the detected
instance. If the filtering operation outputs a detected
instance, then Bob performs the two-valued measure-
ment on the resulting system (which is not necessarily
a qubit) by using the Z or X basis, which he selects
probabilistically. This measurement certainly supplies
Bob with the bit value for the chosen basis. In so doing,
we consider the virtual protocol running as follows.
(Virtual protocol)
(1) The same as Step (1) in the Actual protocol.
(2) (Loop phase 1) Alice prepares two single-photons in
the maximally entangled state |φ+〉AB, and sends
Bob the system B via the quantum channel.
(3) (Loop phase 2) Bob performs on the incoming sys-
tem B′ the filtering operation {√Mfail,
√
1 −Mfail}
to determine whether or not the pulse is detected,
and he announces his result over an authenticated
public channel. If the pulse is detected, Alice and
Bob increase Ndet by 1 unit.
(4) (Loop phase 3) Alice and Bob probabilistically and
independently select the basis, and they announce
their choices over an authenticated public channel.
If both of them have selected the Z (X) basis, they
keep systems A and B and define them as the Z (X)-
system. Moreover, if Ndet = N
(Ter)
det is satisfied,
Alice and Bob proceed to Step (5), otherwise Alice
and Bob return to Step (2).
(5) (Sifted key generation) Alice and Bob measure all
the Z (X)-systems with the Z (X) basis. As a result,
they generate the sifted keys ~sA,Z (~sA,X) and ~sB,Z
(~sB,X), respectively.
(6) (Error correction and privacy amplification) The
same as Step (6) in the Actual protocol.
(7) (Error verification) The same as Step (7) in the
Actual protocol.
It is easy to see that this virtual protocol provides Eve
exactly the same quantum and classical information as
the Actual protocol. Moreover, the statistics of Alice and
Bob’s measurement outcomes do not change either. This
means that we can consider such a virtual protocol for
the security proof. To prove the security of the virtual
protocol, we need to find a quantum state from which
Alice and Bob generate the key. For that, let ρAB
′
NZ,~I
be
the quantum state of Alice and Bob’s NZ pairs of the Z-
systems after the termination of the Loop phases. Note
that NZ depends on the classical information announced
by Alice and Bob during the Loop phases. This is so
because Eve’s attack might dependent of the previous
basis announcements, but, importantly once the Loop
phases finish then NZ is a fixed number. Moreover, it
also depends on all the protocol parameters that Alice
and Bob agreed in Step (1) such as the secrecy parameter
ǫs, and the quantity N
(Ter)
det . All such announcements and
protocol parameters are represented by ~I.
We are interested in the bit strings ~sA,Z and ~sB,Z,
which are the outcomes of the Z basis measurements on
the systems in the state ρAB
′
NZ,~I
. Importantly, as already
mentioned above, the fact that we have a description of
such a state before the Z basis measurements to obtain
the sifted keys enables us to employ both the security
proof technique based on the uncertainty principle [15]
and the one based on the entropic uncertainty relation
[17]. If we employ the former (latter) one, the proof
is applied to the state ρAB
′
NZ,~I
(ρAB
′E
NZ,~I
that is an exten-
sion of ρAB
′
NZ,~I
that accommodates Eve’s system). In both
cases, the security argument requires to consider Alice
and Bob’s fictitious X basis measurements (instead of the
Z basis measurements) on such a state. This fictitious X
basis measurement is used to define the phase error rate
eph, i.e., the error rate that Alice and Bob would have
observed if they had measured the systems in the state
ρAB
′
NZ,~I
using the X basis. Note that if we choose to em-
ploy the security proof based on the uncertainty relation,
it is conventional to use the fact that the max-entropy is
upper-bounded by the binary entropy of the phase error
rate [17]. As we will explain in the next section, how-
ever, to estimate eph we will not directly use the state
ρAB
′
NZ,~I
, but we will consider a density operator ρAB
′
i|~Ii−1,~xi−1
that represents a conditional state of the ith pair of the
Z-systems. The exact definition of this state is given in
the next section.
5If the phase error rate eph is estimated to be eph ≤ eph
except with probability η, then it is known, for instance,
that the security proof based on the uncertainty principle
[10, 15, 16] delivers a (ǫs+ǫc)-secure key of length l given
by
l ≥ NZ [1− h(eph)]− log2
2
ǫ2s − η
− λEC − log2
2
ǫc
. (1)
Here, ǫs is the secrecy parameter, λEC is the number
of bits exchanged during the error correction step, and
ǫc is the correctness parameter. A security proof based
on the entropic uncertainty relation provides almost the
same key rate formula [17].
Since the phase error rate is not directly observed in
the Actual protocol, one typically estimates it from quan-
tities like ~sA,X and ~sB,X. For this, a number of security
proofs [2] employ the theory of random sampling with-
out replacement [18]. In so doing, one usually regards
the bit string ~sA,X⊕~sB,X as the test bits to estimate the
number of fictitious phase errors. This is so because the
positions of the bits ~sA,X and ~sB,X within the whole set
of detected instances seem to be chosen probabilistically
and independently.
Unfortunately, however, it has been shown recently [3]
that the random sampling theory does not provide the
correct estimation for eph when the protocol uses the ba-
sis dependent iterative sifting. To understand why this
is so, let us recall the necessary conditions to apply the
random sampling theory (see, for instance, Lemma 7 in
[4]). For this, we first review the mathematical descrip-
tion of the theory, and then its application to the BB84
protocol with iterative sifting. Suppose that we have
a sequence ~Y := (Y1, Y2, · · · , Yn) of two-valued random
variables where Ya (a = 1, 2, · · · , n) takes a bit value.
Then, suppose that we want to estimate the number of
say 1’s in a code sequence that is randomly chosen from
the n bits, given that we know the number of 1’s in the
rest of the sequence (which is called the test sequence).
Let ~T := (T1, T2, · · · , Tn) be the sequence of random vari-
ables that determines which bits form the test sequence.
That is, if Ta = 1 (Ta = 0) then the position a is cho-
sen as part of the test (code) sequence. Importantly,
the random sampling theory requires that (i) ~T has to
be independent of ~Y and (ii) it has to be uniformly dis-
tributed, i.e., all the code sequences with the same length
are chosen equally likely.
It turns out, however, that none of these two condi-
tions (i) and (ii) is satisfied in the case of the BB84 with
the basis dependent iterative sifting. Note that in this
context ~Y corresponds to the sequence of random vari-
ables that represent the phase error pattern, and ~T is
the pattern of the basis choices. That is, Ta determines
whether the ath bit belongs to the code sequence, i.e., Al-
ice and Bob agree in the Z basis, or to the test sequence,
i.e., Alice and Bob agree in the X basis. Then, due to
the iterative sifting procedure, it can be shown that ~T is
not independent of ~Y . To prove this, note that Eve’s de-
cision of whether or not she induces a phase error at the
position a can be made adaptively based on all previous
announcements done by Alice and Bob. That is, since
Ya can depend on the basis choice (T1, T2, · · · , Ta−1), ~T
is not independent of ~Y . What is worse is that, as was
shown in [3], ~T is not uniform. That is, even if the choice
of each of Ta is made uniform, there appears some bias
in the probability distribution of ~T due to the termina-
tion condition. This means that the random sampling
theory does not guarantee the security of the BB84 with
iterative sifting when the termination condition is basis
dependent.
When the basis independent sifting procedure is em-
ployed, we have that, at least, condition (i) is not satisfied
according to the same reasoning. As will be shown in the
next section, to solve this problem, we use Azuma’s in-
equality [6] and the fact that Eve cannot know Alice and
Bob’s basis choice beforehand.
V. PHASE ERROR RATE ESTIMATION BASED
ON AZUMA’S INEQUALITY
In this section we show that the BB84 protocol with
iterative sifting is secure if the phase error rate is esti-
mated using Azuma’s inequality [6] and the termination
condition is basis independent (but the disclosure of the
basis information at each round is allowed). As was al-
ready introduced above, recall that the phase error rate
is the fictitious bit error rate that Alice and Bob would
observe if they measured the systems in the state ρAB
′
NZ,~I
using the X basis. In order to estimate this quantity, it
is convenient to consider a protocol where Alice and Bob
indeed perform the X basis measurements on ρAB
′
NZ,~I
. The
protocol is a modified version of the Virtual protocol in-
troduced above, but it terminates when its Loop phases
finish. More specifically, we replace the Loop phase 3 in
the Virtual protocol with the following step.
(4) (Loop phase 3’) Alice and Bob probabilistically and
independently select the basis, and they announce
their choices over an authenticated public channel.
Then, they measure systems A and B′ using the X
basis, and record their respective outcomes. If the
termination condition Ndet = N
(Ter)
det is satisfied,
they obtain the NZ (NX) bit strings ~s
Vir
A,Z (~sA,X)
and ~sVirB,Z (~sB,X), respectively, which correspond to
the instances with the Z (X) basis agreement. Oth-
erwise Alice and Bob return to Step (2) in the Vir-
tual protocol.
On the one hand, we have that from Eve’s viewpoint
the Loop phases 3 and 3’ are indistinguishable because
Alice and Bob’s announcements coincide. This means
that NZ and NX in Loop phase 3’ are equal to those in
the original Virtual and Actual protocols. On the other
hand, Loop phases 3 and 3’ differ in that the latter re-
quires Alice and Bob to measure the systems A and B′
6immediately after choosing their bases. Moreover, the
performed measurement is always in the X basis inde-
pendently of their basis choice. Hence, ~sVirA,Z and ~s
Vir
B,Z
correspond to the bit strings that Alice and Bob obtain
if they announce the Z basis but perform the X basis mea-
surement. Importantly, the bit error rate between ~sVirA,Z
and ~sVirB,Z coincides with the phase error rate that Alice
and Bob would have obtained if they had measured their
respective systems in the state ρAB
′
NZ,~I
using the X basis in
the original Virtual protocol. This is so because once Eve
has sent the system B′ to Bob at each round of the Loop
phases, it is too late for her to change its state. That is,
it does not matter when Alice and Bob actually measure
their systems, and we can assume in Loop phase 3’ that
they measure them immediately after the confirmation
of the detection event at each round.
For later convenience, let ρAB
′
i|~Ii−1,~xi−1
be Alice and Bob’s
state of the ith detected systems before the X basis mea-
surements in the Loop phase 3’. Note that when both
Alice and Bob choose the Z (X) basis, such a system was
named the Z (X)-basis system in Step (4) of the Virtual
protocol. The state ρAB
′
i|~Ii−1,~xi−1
has the following two cru-
cial properties. First, it is dependent on all the informa-
tion announced by Alice and Bob up to the (i−1)th round
as well as on all the predetermined protocol parameters.
This includes, for instance, all the previous basis infor-
mation and detection pattern, the secrecy parameter ǫs,
and the quantity N
(Ter)
det for the termination condition.
All such information disclosed up to the (i − 1)th round
is represented by the subscript ~Ii−1. Importantly, this
means that ρAB
′
i|~Ii−1,~xi−1
accommodates the effects of iter-
ative sifting and the termination condition, especially it
takes into account attacks that exploit the basis depen-
dency. Moreover, this state can be correlated with all
the previous outcomes obtained by Alice and Bob’s X
basis measurements up to the (i−1)th round of the Loop
phases, and those outcomes are represented by ~xi−1. The
second property is that ρAB
′
i|~Ii−1,~xi−1
does not depend on
Alice and Bob’s basis choices on the ith round. This is
because Alice and Bob announce their basis choices for
the ith round after Eve has already interacted with the
ith pulse and sent it to Bob.
Next, we estimate the number of phase errors that Al-
ice and Bob obtain by measuring the systems in the state
ρAB
′
i|~Ii−1,~xi−1
for i = 1, 2, · · · , N (Ter)det . Before we explain the
estimation method in detail, let us begin by presenting
a sketch of the method. Suppose that Alice and Bob re-
peat the Loop phase steps many times until the termina-
tion condition is eventually satisfied. Importantly, at this
termination point, all the measurements have finished
and the number of detected events is fixed and equal
to N
(Ter)
det , and it is independent of all the basis choices.
This is important for defining sequences of bounded Mar-
tingale random variables with a fixed length. For the
estimation, we consider a particular round in the Loop
phase, say the ith round, and we derive a relationship,
for the ith round, between the probability of having a
phase error and the one of having an error for the X-
basis measurement outcomes when both Alice and Bob
choose this basis. Finally, given such a relationship, we
can employ Azuma’s inequality to transform these prob-
abilities to the actual number of events. This way, we
can estimate the phase error rate from the number of er-
rors wt(~sA,X ⊕ ~sB,X) between the strings ~sA,X and ~sB,X.
Importantly, Azuma’s inequality already takes into ac-
count any correlation possibly generated by Eve among
the rounds. This includes the most general correlations
that could arise if Alice sends the single-photon pulses
all in once and Eve applies a joint operation over all the
single-photon pulses. Even in this general case, the ith
state can be represented by ρAB
′
i|~Ii−1,~xi−1
. This is so because
the way how the announcements are made is still in a se-
quential manner, and Alice and Bob’s measurements for
the previous (i−1) pairs of the systems remain the same.
Let us now explain the estimation method in detail.
We note that the following discussion does not assume
any specific ~xi and ~Ii, and hence it holds for any ~xi
and ~Ii. Following the prescription described above, we
need to consider the following two probabilities. The
first one is the conditional probability that Alice and Bob
choose the Z basis but measure the systems in the condi-
tional state ρAB
′
i|~Ii−1,~xi−1
along the X basis and obtain the
phase error. The second one is the conditional probabil-
ity that Alice and Bob choose and announce the X basis
and use this basis to measure the systems in the condi-
tional state ρAB
′
i|~Ii−1,~xi−1
and they obtain the error in the
X basis. Let us denote the former (latter) probability
by P (i)(Ph|~xi−1, ~Ii−1) (P (i)(X error|~xi−1, ~Ii−1)). These
probabilities are given by
P (i)(Ph|~xi−1, ~Ii−1) = qZTr
(
ρAB
′
i|~Ii−1,~xi−1
Π(X)err
)
P (i)(X error|~xi−1, ~Ii−1) = qXTr
(
ρAB
′
i|~Ii−1,~xi−1
Π(X)err
)
,
(2)
where qZ := p
(A)
Z p
(B)
Z , qX := p
(A)
X p
(B)
X , and Π
(X)
err :=
|0X〉A〈0X| ⊗MX,1 + |1X〉A〈1X| ⊗MX,0 is the POVM el-
ement associated to an error in the X basis. Note that
we can use qZ and qX in these equations because N
(Ter)
det
is independent of Alice and Bob’s basis choices, that is,
the probabilities qZ and qX are independent of ~xi−1 and
~Ii−1. From Eq. (2), we can readily obtain a relationship
for the ith pair between the probabilities as
P (i)(Ph|~xi−1, ~Ii−1)
qZ
=
P (i)(X error|~xi−1, ~Ii−1)
qX
.
(3)
Now that we have the relationship in terms of the prob-
abilities, the next step is to convert this relationship to
the one in terms of the numbers. For this, first we take
the summation over i of the probabilities in Eq. (3) to
7obtain ∑N(Ter)det
i=1 P
(i)(Ph|~xi−1, ~Ii−1)
qZ
=
∑N(Ter)
det
i=1 P
(i)(X error|~xi−1, ~Ii−1)
qX
. (4)
Next, for any ~Ii−1 and ~xi−1, we define the following ran-
dom variables
XPh,j := ΛPh,j −
j∑
i=1
P (i)(Ph|~xi−1, ~Ii−1) (5)
XX error,j := ΛX error,j −
j∑
i=1
P (i)(X error|~xi−1, ~Ii−1) ,
(6)
where ΛPh,j (ΛX error,j) represents the number of in-
stances among the first j detected events where both
Alice and Bob choose the Z (X) basis, measure their sys-
tems along the X basis, and obtain a phase error (bit
error in the X basis). For later use, we define XPh,0 = 0
and XX error,0 = 0. Note that j runs from 0 to N
(Ter)
det .
Importantly, these random variables satisfy the bounded
differential condition (BDC), i.e, |XPh,j −XPh,j−1| ≤ 1
and |XX error,j − XX error,j−1| ≤ 1 for any 1 ≤ j ≤
N
(Ter)
det . Also, they are Martingale with respect to ~xj
and ~Ij . Here, Martingale means that {XPh,j}N
(Ter)
det
j=0 and
{XX error,j}N
(Ter)
det
j=0 satisfy
E[XPh,j+1|~xj , ~Ij ] = XPh,j , (7)
E[XX error,j+1|~xj , ~Ij ] = XX error,j (8)
for j = 0, · · · , (N (Ter)det −1) and for any ~xj and ~Ij . That is,
the expectation value ofXPh,j+1 conditional on ~xj and ~Ij
isXPh,j, and similarly forXX error,j+1. We note that with
BDC and Martingale, we can apply Azuma’s inequality
to {XPh,j}N
(Ter)
det
j=0 and {XX error,j}
N
(Ter)
det
j=0 [19]. This is what
we do next.
An important point to be able to apply Azuma’s in-
equality to the sequence of the bounded Martingale ran-
dom variables, {XPh,j}N
(Ter)
det
j=0 , is that the length of this
sequence is fixed and independent of all the basis choices,
which is clearly satisfied in our case thanks to the basis
independent termination condition. Therefore, we can
directly apply Azuma’s inequality [19] to {XPh,j}N
(Ter)
det
j=0
to obtain that ∀δ > 0, ∀N (Ter)det > 0, ∀~Ii−1, ∀~xi−1, and for
all outcomes of Λ
Ph,N
(Ter)
det
with N
(Ter)
det ≥ ΛPh,N(Ter)det ≥ 0,
Pr

Λ
Ph,N
(Ter)
det
−
N
(Ter)
det∑
i=1
P (i)(Ph|~xi−1, ~Ii−1) ≥ N (Ter)det δ


≤ e−(N(Ter)det )δ2/2 (9)
holds [6, 9, 10, 19]. Similarly, we have that ∀δ > 0,
∀N (Ter)det > 0, ∀~Ii−1, ∀~xi−1, and for all outcomes of
Λ
(Ter)
X error,Ndet
with N
(Ter)
det ≥ ΛX error,N(Ter)det ≥ 0
Pr
(∑N(Ter)det
i=1 P
(i)(X error|~xi−1, ~Ii−1)− ΛX error,N(Ter)
det
≥ N (Ter)det δ
)
≤ e−(N(Ter)det )δ2/2 . (10)
Then, by combining Eqs. (4), (9), and (10) with the
fact that Λ
X error,N
(Ter)
det
= wt(~sA,X ⊕ ~sB,X), we have that
Λ
Ph,N
(Ter)
det
≤ qZ
qX
wt(~sA,X ⊕ ~sB,X) +
(
qZ
qX
+ 1
)
N
(Ter)
det δ
=: Λ
Ph,N
(Ter)
det
(11)
holds except for error probability less than
2e−(N
(Ter)
det )δ
2/2. Finally, we set eph = ΛPh,N(Ter)det
/NZ
and η = 2e−(N
(Ter)
det )δ
2/2, and by plugging them into
Eq. (1), we have the final key length with the security
parameter equal to ǫs + ǫc. This concludes the security
proof.
VI. SECURITY OF THE LOSS-TOLERANT
PROTOCOL AND DISCUSSION
We have demonstrated that the BB84 protocol with
iterative sifting and the basis independent termination
condition is secure if one employs Azuma’s inequality to
estimate the parameters needed for privacy amplification.
The essential points of the security proof can be summa-
rized as follows. (1) First, we consider a virtual protocol
where the measurements that generate the sifted keys are
postponed. This way, we obtain a clear description of the
state of the shared systems. (2) Second, this state satis-
fies that, at any particular round within the Loop phase
steps, it can only depend on the announcements made
before that round as well as on all the protocol parame-
ters. (3) Third, we have that this state is independent of
Alice and Bob’s basis choice at the current round, as the
basis announcement for each round is always made once
Bob has received his system. (4) Finally, the length of
the random variable sequences of our interest is fixed to
a predetermined parameter and it is independent of all
the basis choices.
Thanks to (1), we can use the conventional framework
of security proofs such as, for instance, the technique
based on the uncertainty principle [15] or the one based
on the entropic uncertainty relation [17]. Also, as we have
seen above, point (2) does not allow us to use the ran-
dom sampling theory because this theory requires that
the state of the whole Alice and Bob’s systems is inde-
pendent of all their basis choices. And, finally, thanks to
(3) and (4) we can use Azuma’s inequality for the estima-
tion instead. This is so because the state is independent
8of the basis choice at the current round and Alice and
Bob choose the bases with probabilities as prescribed in
the protocol. Note as well that Azuma’s inequality al-
ready takes into account any possible correlation among
the events.
We note that several QKD protocols with iterative sift-
ing and the basis independent termination condition sat-
isfy the conditions (2)-(4). Therefore if one uses Azuma’s
inequality [9, 10] and a virtual protocol that satisfies the
condition (1) in the security proof, such protocols are
secure even with iterative sifting and the basis indepen-
dent termination condition. To see this, let us consider
the loss-tolerant protocol [11]. This protocol differs from
the BB84 protocol only in that the loss-tolerant protocol
uses just three states (let us denote them as |φ1〉B, |φ2〉B,
and |φ3〉B) and it exploits the basis mismatch events. Ex-
cept for these differences, all the quantum and classical
communication phases of the loss-tolerant protocol are
the same as those in the BB84 protocol. In particu-
lar, the three states are associated to two bases like in
the BB84 protocol, and therefore, all the classical infor-
mation announced during the Loop phases in the loss-
tolerant protocol with iterative sifting and the basis in-
dependent termination condition is exactly the same as
that of the BB84 protocol with the same sifting and ter-
mination condition.
Now, let us see if the loss-tolerant protocol with iter-
ative sifting and the basis independent termination con-
dition is secure by first checking whether (1)-(4) are sat-
isfied or not. As for (1), fortunately, the security proof
presented in [11] considers an entangled state essentially
of the form
∑5
i=1
√
P (i)|i〉A|φi〉B, where {|i〉A} is a set
of orthonormal states of a system to be held by Alice,
P (i) is the probability of sending the state |φi〉, and |φ4〉
and |φ5〉B are linear combinations of |φ1〉B and |φ2〉B.
Moreover, the key is generated from delayed measure-
ments on the system A and the system B′ where B′ rep-
resents the system B after Eve’s intervention. Therefore,
(1) is satisfied. Moreover, (2)-(4) are satisfied thanks to
the aforementioned fact that all the classical information
announced is the same as the one of the BB84 at any
particular round within the Loop phase. Therefore, all
of (1)-(4) are satisfied. Finaly, note that since the se-
curity proof in [11] employs Azuma’s inequality to deal
with any possible correlation among the events, it is also
valid for the correlation arising from the basis announce-
ments from all the previous rounds [20]. As a result, the
loss-tolerant protocol is secure even if it is implemented
with iterative sifting and the basis independent termi-
nation condition. This also means, for example, that a
generalized version of the loss tolerant protocol [12] is
also secure.
We remark that our proof employs the basis indepen-
dent termination condition where the termination of the
Loop phases is based on the number of detection events
regardless of the basis choices. We leave for our future
work the security proof of a protocol with the basis de-
pendent termination condition.
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